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Optimal Income Tax Rates for the Korean Economy†
By YONGSUNG CHANG, SUN-BIN KIM, BO HYUN CHANG*
Based on a quantitative, heterogeneous agent general equilibrium 
model, we compute the optimal tax rates for labor and capital incomes 
for the Korean economy. According to our model, a more progressive 
income tax schedule along with a higher capital tax rate can increase 
average welfare by as much as 0.86% of permanent consumption. 
Approximately 64% of house-holds, those with low assets and low 
productivity, are better off when a more progressive optimal tax 
schedule is adopted. Despite the potentially significant welfare gains, 
our calculation should be interpreted with caution because our 
benchmark model does not take into account possible capital outflows 
or the increased administrative costs associated with high taxes. 
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  I. Introduction
?
mong OECD members, Korea is considered a “low-inequality and low-
redistribution” country. Figure 1 plots the before- and after-tax/transfer 
income Gini coefficients for 31 OECD countries. All 31 countries are located 
below the 45-degree line, indicating that in all countries incomes are redistributed 
from the rich to the poor. In terms of before-tax/transfer incomes, the Gini 
coefficient of Korea is the lowest (0.34) among the OECD members, whose 
average is 0.47. In terms of after-tax/transfer incomes, the Gini coefficient of Korea 
is about the average of the OECD countries (0.31). In terms of percentage changes 
in the income Gini—the so-called improvement rate of income inequality after 
taxes and transfer Korea exhibits only a 9% decrease, whereas the average decrease 
in Gini coefficients among the OECD countries is 35%.
?
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FIGURE 1. BEFORE-TAX AND AFTER-TAX INCOME INEQUALITY 
?
While finding the right degree of income redistribution has always been a 
primary concern for economists and policy makers, it is not an easy task, since it 
requires modeling a complicated political process and aggregating individual 
preferences. A recent development of quantitative general equilibrium models with 
heterogeneous agents allows us to address this issue at least partially. In this paper, 
we compute the optimal income tax rates for labor and capital for the Korean 
economy. We ask the following two questions: (i) What is the labor and capital 
income tax rates that maximize the average utilitarian welfare of the society? (ii) 
Who will be better off or worse off from the fiscal reform that adopts the tax rate 
that maximizes average welfare? 
We examine these questions through the lens of the Aiyagari model (1994) 
augmented with endogenous labor supply (e.g., Pijoan-Mas (2006) and Chang and 
Kim (2007)). In this model, workers are identical in preferences, but face 
uninsurable productivity shocks and borrowing constraints. Earnings and wealth 
distributions emerge as an equilibrium. In the model economy, we introduce three 
major taxes: total income tax, capital tax, and consumption tax. 
Households are liable to a progressive income tax schedule. More specifically, 
we adopt a parametric net tax function developed by Heathcote, Storesletten, and 
Violante (2013) (referred to as HSV hereafter) to capture the progressive tax 
schedule in a simple way. In addition, we allow a separate capital income tax to 
distinguish the labor and capital income taxes. The consumption tax rate in our 
model is fixed at the current value-added tax (VAT) rate of 10%. 
We calibrate the model economy to match several salient features of the Korean 
economy. For example, the stochastic process of individual productivity is 
estimated from the panel data of wages in the Korea Labor Income Panel Study 
(KLIPS). The cross-sectional income and wealth distributions of the model are 
somewhat less dispersed than but largely comparable to those in the data. 
We then look for the optimal degree of progressivity in the income tax schedule 
and capital tax rate that maximizes the (equal-weight) utilitarian social welfare 
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function. According to our model, the optimal tax policy requires a more 
progressive income tax schedule and a higher capital income tax rate than the 
current one. For example, the marginal tax rate for the household in the 9th decile 
(top 10%) in the income distribution has to increase from the current 22% to 31%. 
The average net income tax rate has to fall from the current 3.75% to -0.9%. 
When the optimal tax reform is in place, the average welfare of households 
increases by as much as 0.86% of steady-state consumption, which is 
approximately 300 thousand won (in 2010 value) each year. About 64% of 
households will be better off from this optimal tax reform. Households with low 
assets and low productivity win, but households with high assets or high 
productivity will lose from the optimal tax reform. Across consumption deciles, 
households in the 1st consumption decile gain welfare by as much as 3.4% of their 
permanent consumption (709 thousand won annually). Households in the 9th decile 
lose welfare by as much as 3.4% of their permanent consumption (1,656 thousand 
won annually). 
Despite a potentially large welfare gain from tax reforms, our results should be 
interpreted with caution because our benchmark model does not take into account 
the possible capital outflow or the increased administrative costs associated with 
high income taxes. Indeed an open-economy version of our model indicates that 
there will be a significant capital flight from high capital income tax rates. A 
sizable administrative cost due to bureaucracy would also undermine the potential 
welfare gain from high taxes. 
Our results are closely related to those in the existing literature. Aiyagari and 
McGrattan (1998) developed a heterogeneous agents model with incomplete 
markets and analyzed the optimal debt policy under the utilitarian social welfare 
functions. However, while the income tax schedule is linear in their model, we 
allow for progressive income taxes. HSV (2014) provided a tractable model of 
optimal tax progressivity. The endogenous labor supply and skill accumulation 
limits high progressivity—the optimal rate in their model is lower than the current 
progressivity. Our model embodies capital tax rates and consumption tax rates as 
well as income tax and focuses on the optimal tax rate for the Korean economy. 
Our results imply that the optimal tax rate in Korea is much higher and more 
progressive than the current tax schedule. Chang et al. (2015) computed the optimal 
income tax rate for each of the 31 OECD countries, including Korea.1 Under the 
linear income tax and lump-sum transfer, Chang et al. found that the optimal 
income tax rate in Korea is 32%, much higher than the current tax to GDP ratio of 
23%. In this paper, we extend the model in Chang et al. to incorporate a progressive 
income tax schedule as well as separate capital and consumption taxes. To our 
knowledge, this is the first estimate to find the optimal progressivity for the Korean 
economy based on a quantitative heterogeneous agents general equilibrium model. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II documents key 
statistics about the tax and redistribution policies of Korea and other OECD 
countries. Section III lays out the benchmark model economy and calibrates to 
Korean data. In Section IV, we compute the optimal tax reform under the utilitarian 
social welfare function and examine who will be better off from the optimal tax 
?
1We also uncovered the Pareto weights that justify the observed tax rate for each country. 
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reform. Section V concludes. 
?
II. Data 
? ?
A. Tax and Redistribution Policies 
?
We document some stylized facts about tax and redistribution policies in Korea 
and the OECD countries. Table 1 summarizes the tax-to-GDP ratios, Gini 
coefficients, and per capita GDP of 34 OECD countries. The total tax revenue to 
GDP ratio of Korea is 23%, the third lowest among the OECD countries, whose 
average is 33%. The second and third columns of Table 1 report the before- and 
after-tax/transfer income Gini coefficients. (The before-tax income Gini is not 
available for Turkey, Mexico, and Hungary.) Korea shows the lowest before-tax 
income Gini (0.34). But, Korea’s after-tax income Gini (0.31) is close to the  
?
TABLE 1—KEY STATISTICS FOR THE 34 OECD COUNTRIES, 2010 
 Tax/Y 
 (%) 
Before  
Gini 
After  
Gini 
Improvement
(%) 
Wealth 
Gini 
per capita 
GDP ($) 
Australia 25.6 0.469 0.334 28.8 0.636 57,535 
Austria 40.9 0.479 0.267 44.3 0.693 45,171 
Belgium 42.4 0.478 0.262 45.2 0.655 43,292 
Canada 30.5 0.447 0.320 28.4 0.728 47,297 
Chile 19.5 0.531 0.508 4.3 0.774 12,727 
Czech Republic 32.5 0.449 0.256 43.0 0.743 18,873 
Denmark 46.5 0.429 0.252 41.3 0.701 56,428 
Estonia 33.2 0.487 0.319 34.5 0.660 14,212 
Finland 40.8 0.479 0.260 45.7 0.662 44,134 
France 41.6 0.505 0.303 40.0 0.755 39,596 
Germany 35.0 0.492 0.286 41.9 0.777 40,418 
Greece 31.1 0.522 0.337 35.4 0.714 26,379 
Hungary 37.6 ... 0.272 ... 0.641 12,750 
Iceland 33.3 0.393 0.244 37.9 0.663 39,511 
Ireland 26.8 0.591 0.266 55.0 0.727 45,921 
Israel 30.6 0.501 0.376 25.0 0.783 30,396 
Italy 41.5 0.503 0.319 36.6 0.646 33,982 
Japan 27.6 0.488 0.336 31.1 0.596 42,918 
Korea 23.2 0.341 0.310 9.1 0.726 20,540 
Luxembourg 38.0 0.464 0.270 41.8 0.623 102,568 
Mexico 18.5 ... 0.466 ... 0.780 9,189 
Netherlands 36.1 0.424 0.288 32.1 0.812 46,783 
New Zealand 31.0 0.454 0.317 30.2 0.725 32,757 
Norway 42.6 0.423 0.249 41.1 0.779 86,101 
Poland 31.3 0.468 0.305 34.8 0.753 12,198 
Portugal 30.0 0.522 0.344 34.1 0.725 21,512 
Slovak Republic 27.7 0.437 0.261 40.3 0.621 16,073 
Slovenia 36.7 0.453 0.246 45.7 0.639 22,938 
Spain 31.4 0.507 0.338 33.3 0.662 30,058 
Sweden 43.1 0.441 0.269 39.0 0.806 49,375 
Switzerland 26.5 0.372 0.298 18.7 0.806 70,523 
Turkey 26.2 ... 0.409 ... 0.842 10,015 
United Kingdom 32.8 0.523 0.345 34.8 0.675 36,869 
United States 23.7 0.499 0.380 23.8 0.852 48,287 
Average 32.8 0.470 0.312 34.8 0.717 37,275 
Std. Dev. 7.1 0.050 0.061 10.5 0.069 21,270 
Source: Wealth Ginis are obtained from Credit Suisse (2012) and others are from the OECD (2015). 
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TABLE 2— CORRELATIONS FOR THE 34 OECD COUNTRIES IN 2010 
 Before Gini 
After 
Gini ? Gini (%) Tax/Y (%) 
Wealth 
Gini 
Before Gini  1.00 0.41 0.26 -0.09 -0.08 
After Gini  0.41 1.00 -0.76 -0.70 0.37 
? Gini (%)  0.26 -0.76 1.00 0.66 -0.33 
Tax/Y (%)  -0.09 -0.70 0.66 1.00 -0.24 
Wealth Gini  -0.08 0.37 -0.33 -0.24 1.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations with data from the OECD (2015) and Credit Suisse (2012). 
?
?
?
FIGURE 2. TAX/GDP AND IMPROVEMENT RATE 
?
 
FIGURE 3. TAX/GDP AND AFTER-TAX INCOME INEQUALITY 
Ta
x/
G
D
P
0.5 
DEN
0.45
0.4
SWENO
R 
ITA FRA 
BEL 
AUFIN   
LUX 
0.35
NED
EST ICE
ISR CANNEWSPPOL
SLO 
GER
CZE 
0.3
0.25
0.2
SWI
KOR USA 
CHI
POR
JAP SVK 
IRE 
AUL 
10 20 30 40 50 60
Improvement Rate (%) 
HUN
Ta
x/
G
D
P
0.5 
DEN
0.45
NORELSWE
FRAITA
FINUT
0.4
LUX
SLO
0.35
ICE 
CZE
0.3
SVK 
IRE
0.25
0.2
NED 
GER
EST 
UK
POLNEW SPA
CAN ISR
POR
JAP 
SWI
AUL
KOR USA 
TUR
CHI 
MEX 
0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55
After−Tax Income Gini 
6 KDI Journal of Economic Policy AUGUST 2015 
OECD average. The before-tax income Gini ranges from 0.37 (Switzerland) to 0.59 
(Ireland), and the after-tax income Gini from 0.24 (Iceland) to 0.51 (Chile). The 
fourth column represents the percentage decrease from the before-tax income Gini 
to after-tax/transfer income Gini coefficients (a measure of the degree of 
redistribution). In Korea, taxes and transfers reduce income inequality by only 9%, 
whereas they reduce income inequality by 35% on average among 31 OECD 
countries. Only Chile (4%) shows a smaller decrease than Korea. These facts imply 
that Korean currently adopts a “low tax and low transfer policy.” 
Two income Ginis are, however, modestly correlated with the correlation 
coefficient of 0.4, indicating varying degrees of redistribution policies across 
countries. Tax revenues are closely related to redistributions and after-tax income 
Ginis. As Figure 2 illustrates, the improvement rates of income Ginis are fairly 
strongly correlated with the tax to GDP ratios (correlation coefficient of 0.65). This 
is confirmed by Figure 3, which shows a strong negative correlation, -0.70, 
between the tax to GDP ratio and the after-tax income Gini. Broadly speaking, high 
taxes are likely to be used for income redistribution purposes and to make incomes 
more equal. 
?
B. Tax Structures 
?
Korea’s tax system consists of ten national and eleven local taxes (MOSF 2012). 
As described in Table 3, national taxes are classified into internal taxes, customs 
duties, and three earmarked taxes. Local taxes are classified into province taxes and 
city-county taxes. Table 4 reports the tax revenues (relative to national GDP) of 
each item. The total tax revenue, including social security contributions, was 23.2% 
of GDP in 2010 (OECD). Most of the tax revenue comes from individual income 
taxes (3.3% of GDP), corporate income taxes (3.2%), social security contributions 
(5.3%), and the value-added tax (4.1%). More detailed information about the major 
taxes (income taxes, corporation income taxes, and the value-added tax) and social 
insurance is provided in Appendix A.  
Table 5 compares the Korean tax revenue structure to those of the OECD 
countries. Korea’s total tax revenue (23.2% of GDP) is much smaller than that of 
other OECD countries (average 32.8%). Only Chile (19.5%) and Mexico (18.5%) 
show lower tax revenues than Korea. The major tax items are similar across OECD 
countries; individual income taxes, corporate income taxes, social security 
contributions and taxes on goods and services. The low tax revenues relative to 
GDP in Korea are mainly due to the low individual income taxes and social 
security contributions in Korea. The revenues from individual income taxes and 
social security contributions are 3.3% and 5.3% of GDP, respectively, in Korea. 
Corresponding figures for the OECD on average are 8.2% and 8.9%, respectively. 
Also, taxes on goods and services (7.9% of GDP), including value-added tax 
revenues, are slightly lower than the OECD average (10.7%). The tax revenue from 
corporate income (3.2% of GDP) is slightly higher than the OECD average (2.8%).? ?
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TABLE 3—NATIONAL AND LOCAL TAXES IN KOREA 
National Taxes   
 Internal Taxes  
  Individual Income Tax 
  Corporate Income Tax 
  Gift Tax 
  Comprehensive Real Estate Holding Tax 
  Value-Added Tax 
  Individual Consumption Tax 
  Liquor Tax 
  Stamp Tax 
  Securities Transaction Tax 
 Customs Duties  
 Earmarked Taxes  
  Transportation-Energy-Environment Tax 
  Education Tax 
  Special Tax for Rural Development 
Local Taxes   
 Province Taxes  
  Acquisition Tax 
  Registration and License Tax 
  Leisure Tax 
  Local Consumption Tax 
  Community Resource and Facility Tax 
  Local Education Tax 
 City & County Taxes  
  Inhabitant Tax 
  Property Tax 
  Automobile Tax 
  Local Income Tax 
  Tobacco Consumption Tax 
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance (2012). 
?
TABLE 4—TAX REVENUE STRUCTURE IN KOREA, 2010 
Tax Items Revenue (% of GDP) 
Total tax revenue  23.2 
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains  6.6 
Of individuals  3.3 
On income and profits  2.7 
On capital gains  0.6 
Corporate  3.2 
Social security contributions  5.3 
Employees  2.2 
Employers  2.3 
Self-employed or non-employed  0.8 
Taxes on payroll and workforce  0.1 
Taxes on property  2.6 
Recurrent taxes on immovable property  0.7 
Estate, inheritance and gift taxes  0.2 
Taxes on financial and capital transactions  1.7 
Taxes on goods and services  7.9 
Taxes on production, sale, transfer, etc. 7.6 
General taxes (Value added taxes)  4.1 
Taxes on specific goods and services  3.5 
Taxes on use of goods and perform activities  
(License tax, automobile tax) 
0.3 
Other taxes  0.8 
Source: OECD database (2015). 
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TABLE 5— TAX REVENUES OF THE OECD COUNTRIES, 2010 
Countries Total Individual
Income 
Corporate 
Income 
Security 
Cont’n 
Payroll Property Goods 
Australia  25.6 9.8 4.7 0.0 1.3 2.4 7.4 
Austria    40.9 9.2 1.9 14.1 2.8 0.5 11.5 
Belgium  42.4 12.0 2.6 13.7 0.0 3.1 10.7 
Canada   30.5 10.7 3.2 4.7 0.6 3.5 7.5 
Chile    19.5 - - 1.3 0.0 0.7 10.0 
Czech Republic  32.5 3.3 3.2 14.6 0.0 0.4 10.8 
Denmark    46.5 23.7 2.7 1.0 0.2 1.9 14.8 
Estonia  33.2 5.3 1.3 12.8 0.0 0.3 13.3 
Finland  40.8 12.1 2.4 12.1 0.0 1.1 13.0 
France   41.6 7.0 2.1 16.1 1.3 3.5 10.5 
Germany  35.0 8.5 1.5 13.7 0.0 0.8 10.3 
Greece   31.1 4.4 2.4 10.9 0.0 1.0 12.1 
Hungary  37.6 6.4 1.2 11.8 0.6 1.2 16.0 
Iceland  33.3 12.2 0.9 3.9 0.2 2.3 11.7 
Ireland  26.8 8.2 2.4 4.3 0.2 1.6 9.9 
Israel   30.6 5.6 2.6 5.2 1.2 2.9 12.2 
Italy    41.5 11.3 2.7 13.0 0.0 2.0 10.8 
Japan    27.6 5.1 3.2 11.3 0.0 2.7 5.2 
Korea    23.2 3.3 3.2 5.3 0.1 2.6 7.9 
Luxembourg  38.0 8.0 5.9 11.0 0.0 2.7 10.3 
Mexico     18.5 - - 2.8 0.3 0.3 9.7 
Netherlands  36.1 8.0 2.0 13.2 0.0 1.4 11.1 
New Zealand  31.0 11.7 3.8 0.0 0.0 2.1 12.3 
Norway     42.6 10.1 10.0 9.6 0.0 1.2 11.8 
Poland     31.3 4.4 2.0 10.9 0.3 1.2 12.3 
Portugal    30.0 5.4 2.7 8.7 0.0 1.1 11.8 
Slovak Republic 27.7 2.3 2.5 12.0 0.0 0.4 10.1 
Slovenia  36.7 5.6 1.8 14.9 0.1 0.6 13.6 
Spain    31.4 6.8 1.7 11.8 0.0 2.0 8.4 
Sweden    43.1 12.0 3.3 10.8 3.1 1.0 12.7 
Switzerland  26.5 8.5 2.7 6.3 0.0 2.0 6.0 
Turkey    26.2 3.7 1.9 6.5 0.0 1.1 12.5 
United Kingdom  32.8 9.4 2.9 6.2 0.0 4.0 10.1 
United States  23.7 7.9 2.3 6.1 0.0 3.1 4.3 
Average  32.8 8.2 2.8 8.9 0.4 1.7 10.7 
Source: OECD database (2015). 
 
C. Taxes in the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
?
We now examine the detailed tax burdens across households in Korea. 
According to the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), the average 
household in Korea paid 3.5% of its factor income (total income minus 
public/private transfers) as taxes and 5.6% of their factor incomes as social security 
contributions in 2010.  
Table 6 reports the taxes and social security contributions across various income 
deciles. The ratio of taxes and contributions to factor income increases gradually, 
from 7.4% in the third decile of income distribution to 11.2% in the tenth decile, 
reflecting the progressivity of taxes. (The increase is not uniform owing to 
differences in household compositions and received transfers.) Even in the tenth 
decile, the average tax rate is quite low, despite the top statutory income tax rate 
(41.8%) and social security contribution (4.5% for pensions and 3.035% for health ?  
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TABLE 6—HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND TAXES, 2010 
Deciles 
Factor 
Income 
(?) 
Head 
Age 
Household
Size 
Tax 
(%) 
Tax + Pension
(%) 
Total Burden 
(%) 
Incl. health insur. 
Avg. 3,308,404 48.5 3.3 3.5 6.4 9.1 
1st 471,064 59.9 2.4 3.7 5.7 12.4 
2nd 1,196,617 53.2 2.8 2.2 4.1 7.6 
3rd 1,810,447 48.2 3.1 1.8 4.3 7.4 
4th 2,376,085 46.9 3.3 2.1 4.7 7.6 
5th 2,765,257 46.1 3.4 2.0 4.8 7.8 
6th 3,203,106 45.6 3.5 2.2 5.0 7.5 
7th 3,779,627 45.4 3.6 2.5 5.6 7.9 
8th 4,363,141 46.2 3.6 3.2 6.3 8.7 
9th 5,273,345 46.5 3.6 4.0 7.1 9.5 
10th 7,833,813 47.1 3.7 6.0 8.9 11.2 
Notes: Factor Income = Labor + Business + Capital Income = Total Income ? Transfer (public/private) 
Total Burden = (Tax + Pension Contribution + Health Insurance)/Factor Income 
Source: Household Income and Expenditure Survey. 
?
TABLE 7—EQUIVALIZED HOUSEHOLD INCOMES ACROSS DECILES, 2010 
Decile points Market Income  (?) 
Disposable Income  
(?) 
Net Tax rate 
(%) 
Avg. 1,796,169 1,728,745 0.0375 
1st 488,448 620,458 -0.270 
2nd 882,314 929,720 -0.053 
3rd 1,168,217 1,162,682 0.005 
4th 1,415,337 1,376,870 0.027 
5th 1,625,759 1,569,030 0.035 
6th 1,867,261 1,788,347 0.042 
7th 2,160,059 2,045,944 0.053 
8th 2,552,677 2,388,744 0.064 
9th 3,201,613 2,978,920 0.070 
Notes:?All incomes are equivalized: divided by the square root of household size. 
Source: Household Income and Expenditure Survey. 
?
insurance).2 This may reflect the fact that various deductions lower the effective 
tax rate considerably, even for those in the high-income brackets. Surprisingly, 
while the taxes and contributions paid by households in the first decile (the poorest 
10%) are the lowest, their taxes with regard to factor incomes are very high 
(12.4%). One reason is that in the first decile, the average household size (2.4) is 
much smaller than the population average (3.3); moreover, the average age of 
household head (59.9) is much older than the population average (48.5). Because 
many tax deductions are child related, the tax burden on households without young 
children would be much greater than the population average. To avoid this issue, 
we next consider tax rates based on household-size equivalent units.  
Table 7 reports the market income, disposable income, and the net tax rate (1?
disposable income
market  income
) based on the equivalized scale (income divided by the square 
root of the household size) across income deciles.3 The net tax rate of households  
?
2Social security contributions including pension and health insurance are proportional to household income.  
3In many studies on income inequality, household incomes are often adjusted by household size. For example, 
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TABLE 8—GINI COEFFICIENTS OF INCOMES, 2010 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Before taxes/transfer  0.345 0.341 0.342 0.338 0.336 
After taxes/transfer  0.314 0.310 0.311 0.307 0.302 
Percentage Decrease (%) 8.990 9.090 9.060 9.170 10.120 
Source: Household Income and Expenditure Survey. 
?
 
FIGURE 4. MARKET AND DISPOSABLE INCOME 
Notes: Data points are from the equivalized income deciles for 2006 to 2013 (HIES). 
?
in the first income decile is now much lower (-27%) than those in other deciles, 
implying that these households received 27% of their market income as a net 
transfer in 2010. HIES also reports the Gini coefficients before taxes and transfers 
(shown in Table 8). Taxes and social transfers reduced the income Gini by 
approximately 9%-10% in the years 2009-2013. 
Summarizing the progressivity of taxes is not simple owing to the complexity of 
the income tax schedule and various deductions. One practical way is to assume a 
specific parametric form of tax function with a few parameters. We assume that the 
individual income tax schedule follows the HSV (2014) type (referred to as the 
HSV tax function hereafter): 
 
Tax 1( ) = ?i i iT y y ?y ??   
Disposable income 1( ) = ?i iD y ?y ?   
log ( ) = log (1 )logi iD y ? ? y? ? ?  
?  
?
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TABLE 9—OLS ESTIMATES FOR THE HSV TAX FUNCTION 
 Log(?) 1 - ? ? R2 
Coefficient  1.9418 0.8629 0.1371 0.9942 
S. D.  0.1118 0.0079 -  
Source: Household Income and Expenditure Survey. 
?
TABLE 10—TAX RATES: DATA AND ESTIMATION 
(UNIT: 10,000 WON/MONTH, %) 
Income Decile 1st 2nd 4th 6th 8th 9th 
Data (HIES)       
Market income  47 68 142 187 255 320 
Net tax rate  -27.02 -5.37 2.72 4.23 6.42 6.96 
Estimated HSV       
Net tax rate  -15.71 -6.70 -0.01 3.72 7.76 10.58 
Marginal tax rate  0.15 7.93 13.7 16.92 20.41 22.84 
Notes: Based on decile points of the equivalized income distribution for 2010. The marginal tax rates are 
based on the estimated HSV tax function. 
?
In the HSV tax function, two parameters, ?  and ? , characterize disposal income, 
D( iy ), as a function of the household’s market income iy .
4 
We estimate ?  and ?  based on cross-sectional data. Because tax and transfer 
data at the individual household level are not available, we use the reported data 
across income deciles for 2006-2013 as our data points by assuming that the 
parameters are constant during the sample period. Figure 4 plots the market and 
disposable incomes at each decile point from 2006 to 2013.5 Note that both market 
income and disposable income are equivalized by household size; income is 
divided by the square root of the household size. The log of disposable income 
( )y(Dlog i ) and the log of market income ( iylog ) appear to be nearly linear, 
implying that the HSV tax function captures the progressivity of taxes and transfers 
in the data quite well. Table 9 reports the estimation results after regressing 
)y(Dlog i on iylog .  
Based on this estimated HSV tax function, we can now compute the net tax rates 
and marginal tax rates across household incomes. Table 10 compares the actual net 
tax rates in the HIES and those based on the estimated HSV tax function. The 
estimated tax rates fit relatively well for middle-income families. The net tax rates 
in the second, fourth, sixth, and eighth deciles are respectively -5.4%, 2.7%, 4.2%, 
and 6.4% in the HIES. The corresponding rates based on the estimated HSV tax 
function are -6.7%, 0.0%, 3.7%, and 7.8%. One of the shortcomings of the HSV 
tax function is its poor approximation at the low-income level. The net tax rate in 
the first decile in the HIES is -27.0%, whereas the corresponding rate according to 
the estimated HSV function is -15.7 %. 
?
?
4Disposable income is defined as market income ( iy ) minus taxes and contributions plus public trans
fer income.  
5The Statistics Agency of Korea announces equivalized market and disposable incomes for the average of 
each quintile, and at each decile point from the 1st to the 9th. 
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III. Model?
?
Our benchmark economy extends Aiyagari’s (1994) model to endogenous labor 
supply and introduces three taxes: progressive income tax, capital tax, and 
consumption tax.  
Households: There is a continuum (measure one) of worker-households who 
have identical preferences and face an idiosyncratic productivity shock x , which 
evolves over time according to a Markov process with a transition probability 
distribution function 1( | ) = ( | = )x t t? x x Pr x x x x?? ?? . When a household with labor 
productivity tx  chooses to work for th  hours, its labor income is t t tw x h , where 
tw  is the wage rate for the efficiency unit of labor. Households hold assets ta  
that yield the real rate tr . Both labor and capital incomes are liable to progressive 
taxes of the HSV tax function ( (1 )( ) ?y ? y ?? ). Note that the HSV tax functions 
include transfers as well as taxes. Households are also liable to a consumption tax 
at the rate c? . A household maximizes its lifetime utility: 
 
1 1 1/
0
=0{ , } =0
1
{ },max
1 1 1 /
? ?
t t t
tc ht t t
c h? B
? ?
? ?? ?? ?
?
?
?E   
 
subject to 
 
 11(1 ) = ( (1 ) ) tc t t t t k t t t
?? c ? w x h ? r a a a ??? ? ? ? ?   
 1ta a? ?   
 
where tc  is consumption. Parameters ?  and ?  represent relative risk aversion 
and labor-supply elasticity, respectively. Capital markets are incomplete in the 
sense that physical capital is the only available asset for households to insure 
against idiosyncratic shocks to their productivity, and households face a borrowing 
constraint: aat ?  for all t . 
In our model, households that own assets pay capital taxes at the rate k?  
separately. These capital taxes are intended to capture corporate income taxes in the 
data. While the corporate income tax is levied on firms’ profit, in our model firms 
operate in a competitive market yielding zero profits. A perfectly competitive 
goods market is assumed to avoid a complicated market structure on the production 
side (see below). Since the assets held by households in our model are the claims 
on production capital, we interpret the taxes on capital income in our model as a 
proxy for taxes on stockholders’ incomes in the data. Thus, in our model, 
individual income taxes (HSV tax function) are levied on household capital 
incomes ( (1 ) )t t t k t tw x h ? r a? ? after paying corporate income taxes. Finally, 
households differ ex post with respect to their productivity tx  and asset holdings 
ta , whose cross-sectional joint distribution is characterized by the probability 
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measure )x,a(? ttt .  
 
Firms: The representative firm produces output through a constant-returns-to-
scale Cobb-Douglas technology using capital, tK , and effective units of labor, 
=t t tL h x d?? . Firms invest tI  and capital depreciates at the rate ?  each period: 
 
1
,
( )max ? ?t t t t t t
L Kt t
L K w L r ? K? ? ? ?   
 
subject to  
 
1 = (1 )t t tK ? K I? ? ?   
  
Government: Using total tax revenue collected from three types of taxes, the 
government consumes the goods G  and transfers the rest of the revenue to 
households as a lump-sum transfer. The government also balances its budget every 
period:  
? ?( ) ( , , ) =c t t k t t t t? c T y ? r a d? a x e G? ??   
where 1( ) = (1 ) ( (1 ) ) ?t t t t k t t t t t k t tT y w x h ? ra ? w x h ? ra ?? ? ? ? ?   
 
Recursive Representation: It is useful to consider a recursive equilibrium. Let 
)x,a(V  denote the value function of a household with asset holdings a  and 
productivity x . Then V  can be expressed as follows:  
 
1 1 1/
,
1( , ) = [ ( , ) | ]max
1 1 1/
? ?
c h
c hV a x B ? V a x x? ?
? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
E   
 
subject to  
 
1(1 ) = ( (1 ) ) ?c k? c ? wxh ? ra a a? ?? ? ? ? ?   
a a??   
 
Equilibrium: A stationary equilibrium consists of a value function, ( , )V a x ; a 
set of decision rules for consumption, asset holdings, and labor supply, ( , )c a x , 
( , )a a x? , ( , )h a x ; aggregate inputs, K , L ; and the invariant distribution of 
households, ( , )? a x , such that:   
 
1. Individual households optimize: Given w  and r , the individual decision 
rules ( , )c a x , ( , )a a x? , ( , )h a x  and ( , )V a x  solve the Bellman equation. 
 
2. The representative firm maximizes profits:  
1= ( / ) ?w ? K L ?  
= (1 )( / ) ?r ? ? K L ?? ?   
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3. The goods market clears:  
{ ( , ) ( , )} = ( , ) (1 )a a x c a x d? G F L K ? K? ? ? ? ??   
 
4. The factor markets clear:  
 = ( , )L xh a x d??   
=K ad??   
 
5. The government balances the budget:  
1{ (1 ) ( (1 ) ) } =?k k k cwxh ? ra ? wxh ? ra ? ra ? c d? G?? ? ? ? ? ? ??   
 
6. Individual and aggregate behaviors are consistent:  
For all  0A ??  and 0X ?? ,  ? ?0 0 0 0 = ( , ), ,( , ) = 1 ( | )a a a x xA X? A X d? x x d? da dx? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?  
?
IV. Quantitative Analysis?
?
A. Calibration 
?
The time unit is one year. Workers are not allowed to borrow; 0=a . The labor 
income share ?  is 0.64, and the annual depreciation rate of capital ?  is 10%. 
The labor-supply elasticity ?  is set to 1. The risk-aversion parameter ? , 1.4, is 
obtained from Chang et al. (2015). The discount factor = 0.939?  is set so that  
the real interest rate is 6%6 The disutility for labor = 6.126B  is chosen to match 
average working hours, 0.398. 7  The stochastic process for the idiosyncratic 
productivity shock is assumed to be an AR(1): 1=t x t tx ? x ?? ?  where t? ?  
(0, )xN ? . We use the values in Chang and Kim (2008), who estimated them from 
the panel data of individual wages in the KLIPS data. The estimates are x? =0.8 
and x? =0.354. 
The consumption tax rate, c? , is set to the current VAT rate of 10%. The 
consumption tax revenue in our model is 6.5% of GDP, which is somewhat smaller 
than the tax revenue on goods and services, 7.9% of GDP in the data (OECD 
2010). The capital tax rate k? , is set to 24%, so that the capital tax revenue 
(relative to output) in the model is the same as tax revenue on corporate income in 
the data (3.2% of GDP). The parameter for the tax progressivity 0.14=?  is 
?
6According to the Bank of Korea, average yields of Treasury bonds (3-year), corporate bonds (3-year, AA-), 
and corporate bonds (3-year, BBB-) between 2000 and 2010 are 5.07%, 6.01%, and 9.93%, respectively. The 
average inflation rate between 2000 and 2010 is 3.12% (BOK). 
7Average annual working hours, 2187, from the OECD (2010) are divided by 5,500 hours, which is assumed 
to be the total amount of discretionary time. 
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TABLE 11—CALIBRATION 
Parameters Values Description 
( Preference )  
? 0.64 Labor income share 
? 0.939 Discount factor (to match r = 6% ) 
? 1 Frisch elasticity 
B 6.126 Disutility parameter for working (to match h = 0.398) 
? 1.4 Risk-aversion parameter (from Chang et al. (2015)) 
a 0 Borrowing constraint: no borrowing 
( Income process )  
?x 0.800 Persistence of idiosyncratic shock 
  (from Chang and Kim (2008)) 
?x 0.354 Standard deviation of innovation 
  (from Chang and Kim (2008)) 
( Taxes and Expenditures )  
? 0.137 Tax progressivity 
?c 0.100 Consumption tax rate 
  (value-added tax rate = 10%) 
?k 0.237 Capital tax rate 
  (to match corporation tax revenue = 3.2%) 
? 0.899 Average level of taxation 
  (to match net income tax rate = 3.75 %) 
G 0.125 Government consumption/Output 
?
obtained from our estimate based on the HIES. The parameter for the average level 
of taxation = 0.90?  is chosen so that the average net income tax rate in our 
model is the same as that in the HIES (3.75%). Government consumption, G , is 
determined by the balanced budget. The government consumption to GDP ratio in 
our model (12.5%) is slightly smaller that that in the data (13.5% according to the 
National Income Account 2010).?
?
  B. Steady State 
?
The before- and after-tax/transfer income Gini coefficients are 0.341 and 0.310, 
respectively, in the HIES (2010) and 0.390 and 0.357, respectively, according to the 
Survey of Household Finance and Living Conditions (SHFLC 2011).8 The income 
Gini coefficients in our model (0.366 and 0.318, respectively, for before and after 
tax) fall between those from the HIES and the SHFLC. Table 12 compares the 
income and wealth shares across quintile groups of the income distribution 
between the model and the data. The top 20% (the 5th quintile) of households earn 
37.3% and 46.4% of total disposable incomes in the HIES and the SHFLC, 
respectively. The corresponding number in our model is 40.2%. The HIES reports 
that households in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quintiles earn 6.6%, 13.6%, 18.4%, 
and 24.0% of total disposable income. The corresponding shares are 3.8%, 9.7%, 
16.0%, and 24.2% in the SHFLC. Those in our model are 8.1%, 12.4%, 16.6%, and 
22.7%.  
The wealth Gini coefficient for Korea is 0.628 according to the SHFLC (2010), 
whereas it is 0.545 in our model.9 Table 12 also reports the quintile groups of the  
?
8The SHFLC has reported income Gini coefficients before and after tax since 2011. 
9The HIES does not report information on individual assets. 
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TABLE 12— INCOME AND WEALTH SHARES 
 Quintiles 
 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Total 
Disposable Income       
- HIES 6.6 13.6 18.4 24 37.3 100 
    - SHFLC 3.8 9.7 16.0 24.2 46.4 100 
    - Model 8.1 12.4 16.6 22.7 40.2 100 
Wealth       
    - SHFLC 0.4 4.7 10.6 20.4 64.0 100 
    - Model 0.7 5.4 13.4 25.7 54.8 100 
Source: Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES 2010), Survey of Household Finance and Living 
Conditions (SHFLC 2010). 
?
TABLE 13—STEADY STATE 
Variables        Data Model 
Before-tax Gini (BG)  0.340 0.366 
After-tax Gini (AG)  0.310 0.318 
Improvement Rate (1-AG/BG) 0.091 0.132 
Wealth Gini       0.628 0.545 
Interest Rate (r)  - 0.060 
Wage Rate (w)       - 1.01 
Labor Hours (H)   0.398 0.398 
Aggregate Output (Y)  - 0.670 
Aggregate Capital (K)  - 1.508 
Net Tax Rate      0.038 0.038 
Consumption Tax / GDP  0.079 0.065 
Government Consumption/GDP  0.135 0.125 
Capital Tax/GDP      0.032 0.032 
Source: Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), Survey of Household Finance and Living Conditions 
(SHFLC), OECD database 
?
wealth distribution. The SHFLC found that households in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th 
quintiles own 0.4%, 4.7%, 10.6%, 20.4%, and 64.0% of total assets, respectively. 
The corresponding shares in our model economy are 0.7%, 5.4%, 13.4%, 25.7% 
and 54.8%, respectively. Income and wealth inequality in our model is higher than 
that in the HIES, but lower than that in the SHFLC. Overall, the income and wealth 
distributions in our model economy resemble those from the data quite well. 
Table 13 compares the major variables in the data to those in our model. The 
consumption tax revenue and government consumption in our model are close to 
those in the data, although we did not target those ratios. Tax revenues on goods 
and services were 7.9% of GDP (OECD 2013) in 2010; the corresponding rate in 
our model is 6.5%. Government consumption (13.5% of GDP in 2010) in the 
National Account (OECD 2014) is similar to that (12.5%) in our model. 
According to our calibration strategy, the model economy matches the average 
net tax rate in the HIES (3.75%). Table 14 compares net and marginal tax rates at 
decile points between the model and the data. The net tax rate of households in the 
1st decile (bottom 10%) is -27.0% in the HIES, and -15.7% according to the 
estimated HSV tax function. The corresponding figure in our model is -13.9%. The 
net tax rate in the 9th decile in the HIES is 7.0%, somewhat lower than that in our 
model (9.5%). The marginal tax rates in the 1st and 9th deciles under the estimated 
HSV tax function (0.2% and 22.8%) are similar to those in our model (1.7% and 
21.9%). In the middle deciles, the marginal tax rates under the estimated HSV tax 
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TABLE 14—TAX RATES ACROSS INCOME DECILES 
Decile Points 1st 2nd 4th 6th 8th 9th 
Data: HIES       
Relative income  0.27 0.49 0.79 1.04 1.42 1.78 
Net tax rate (%)     -27.02 -5.37 2.72 4.23 6.42 6.96 
Data: Estimated HSV       
Net tax rate (%)       -15.71 -6.70 -0.01 3.72 7.76 10.58 
Marginal tax rate (%) 0.15 7.93 13.7 16.92 20.41 22.84 
Model       
Relative income     0.36 0.46 0.65 0.93 1.40 1.91 
Net tax rate (%)   -13.90 -9.96 -4.85 0.00 5.48 9.52 
Marginal tax rate (%)  1.70 5.11 9.52 13.77 18.44 21.92 
Notes: All incomes are equivalized income at decile points in 2010. Marginal tax rates are based on the 
estimated HSV tax function. The relative incomes are relative to the population average.   
?
TABLE 15—AVERAGE GROSS TAX RATES (%) OF INCOME DECILES 
Income Decile 1st 2nd 4th 6th 8th 9th 10th 
HIES 12.4 7.6 7.0 7.5 8.7 9.5 11.2 
Model  10.1 7.7 7.2 8.2 10.4 12.4 17.4 
Notes: Tax rates in the HIES are the same as those in Table 6; income is not equivalized, and tax rates 
are taxes and contributions divided by factor income. 
?
function (7.9%, 13.7%, 16.9% and 20.4%) are slightly higher than those in our 
model (5.1%, 9.5%, 13.8%, and 18.4%). Overall, the marginal tax rates in our 
model approximate those under the estimated HSV fairly well except for the 1st 
decile (the bottom 10%) despite a simple parametric functional form. 
In order to compare the gross tax rates in our model, we need further 
assumptions about the transfer because the HSV tax function is defined in terms of 
net taxes. We assume a lump-sum transfer to all households. In fact, the amount of 
transfer is actually pretty close to lump-sum in the HIES. The average transfers 
(public plus private, unequivalized income) are 323,309 won in the HIES (2010), 
while the average transfers in the 1st and 10th deciles are 341,708 and 372,828. 
More specifically, we look for the amount of lump-sum transfer in our model so 
that the individual income tax to output ratio matches that in the data (income tax 
and social security contributions to GDP ratio of 8.6%, according to the OECD Tax 
Revenues 2010). Table 15 compares the average gross tax rates across various 
income deciles. The gross tax rates in our model resemble those in the HIES well 
except for the top end of the distribution. The gross tax rate of 11.2% in the 10th 
decile in the HIES is much lower than that in our model, 17.4%.
?
C. Optimal Tax Reform 
?
In the previous section, we developed a quantitative model that approximates 
income inequality and tax policies in Korea. We now address the following 
questions using this model economy: (i) What is the optimal tax rate that 
maximizes the utilitarian social welfare function? (ii) Who will be better (or worse) 
off from the fiscal reform to adopt the optimal tax rate? 
One of the most important subjects in public finance is to characterize the 
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optimal tax policy. This task often requires appropriately aggregating individual 
preferences, which is challenging and controversial. A common practice is to use a 
social welfare function that averages the utility of the population with equal 
weights (i.e., utilitarian criteria). In the context of our model, the utilitarian social 
welfare function can be written as:10, 11  
 
0 0 0 0( , ) = ( , ; , ) ( , ; , ),k k kW ? ? V a x ? ? d? a x ? ??   
 
where )?,?;x,a(V k00  is the discounted sum of the lifetime utility of a household 
with asset holdings 0a  and productivity 0x , and )?,?;x,a(? k00  is the distribution 
of households over ( 00 x,a ) in the steady state given tax progressivity ?  and a 
capital tax rate k? , i.e.,    
1 1 1/
0 0 0
=0
( , ; , ) 1 ( , ; , )( , ; , ) =
1 1 1 /
? ?
t t t k t t k
k
t
c a x ? ? h a x ? ?V a x ? ? ? B? ?
? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
??E   
 
We assume that the model economy is at its steady state under the current tax 
progressivity ( ? ) and two tax rates ( k? , c? ) as reported in Table 13. We then look 
for the new combination of tax progressivity, *? , and capital tax rate, *k? , that 
maximizes *( , )kW ? ? , including the welfare of households during the transition 
period to the new steady state.12 We assume that the consumption tax rate c?  is 
fixed at 0.1. We also assume that the government consumption to output ratio Y/G  
is held constant. The average level of taxation, ? , is determined to ensure a 
balanced budget every period. 
We will compute the social welfare gains under the new tax progressivity ( ? ) 
and capital tax rates ( k? ). The welfare gain in consumption-equivalence units, ? , 
is defined as:  
 
0 0 0 1 1 1
=0 =0
((1 ?) , ) ( , ) = ( , ) ( , )t t
t t
? U c h d? a x ? U c h d? a x?
? ?? ?? ?   
 
where 0c , 0h , 0?  are initial steady states and 1c , 1h , 1?  are those after the 
reform (including transitions). 
Table 16 reports the welfare gains under various tax reforms. Out of 20 
combinations we consider around the current values, *?  = 0.24 and *k?  = 0.39 
achieve the largest welfare gain—a 0.86% increase in permanent consumption. 
?
10This utilitarian social welfare function has been commonly used in the literature, for example, Aiyagari and 
McGrattan (1998). 
11Since we assume consumption tax rate is constant in our model, social welfare is a function of tax 
progressivity ?  and the capital tax rate k? . 
12We include the welfare of households during the transition from the current steady state to a new steady 
state. When a new tax rate is in place in the current steady state, households start re-optimizing their consumption 
and hours worked. As a result, the corresponding paths of the value functions, )?~,?~;x,a(V *k*ttt , and the 
distribution. )?~,?~;x,a(? *k*ttt , will be different from those in the old steady state. Hence, the computation of 
the optimal tax needs to take into account changes in value functions and distributions during transition periods 
until the economy reaches a new steady state. 
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TABLE 16—WELFARE GAINS IN CONSUMPTION EQUIVALENTS 
Progressivity Capital Tax Rates (?k) 
(?) 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.44 
0.14 0.00 0.08 0.14 0.19 0.21 
0.19 0.55 0.61 0.65 0.68 0.68 
0.24 0.79 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.83 
0.29 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.66 
Notes: All numbers are % change (consumption equivalent) from the current steady state. 
?
TABLE 17—CURRENT AND OPTIMAL TAX RATES (%) 
Decile Points 1st 2nd 4th 6th 8th 9th 
Current State       
Relative Income  0.36 0.46 0.65 0.93 1.40 1.91 
Net tax rate     -13.90 -9.96 -4.85 0.00 5.48 9.52 
Marginal tax rate  1.70 5.11 9.52 13.77 18.44 21.92 
Gross tax rate      8.43 7.32 7.36 8.67 11.21 13.68 
Optimal Tax Reform       
Relative Income    0.37 0.47 0.67 0.92 1.37 1.88 
Net tax rate      -32.94 -25.44 -15.30 -6.82 2.78 9.73 
Marginal tax rate  -1.42 4.30 12.01 18.51 25.83 31.13 
Gross tax rate     8.91 7.32 7.65 9.81 13.96 17.9 
?
When converted into 2010 wons, the consumption of all households increases by 
300 thousand won every year.13 Table 17 shows the net and marginal income tax  
rates under the new steady states.14 The average net tax rates of income decreases 
from 3.75% to -0.87% on average due to a more aggressive redistribution. With the 
increased progressivity, households, except for those in top 10% income 
distribution, now face lower net tax rates. The marginal tax rates increase with 
income at a steeper rate. The marginal tax rate of 31.1% in the 9th decile in the new 
steady state is much higher than 21.9% under the initial steady state. Since the 
HSV function is defined in terms of net tax burden, we need another assumption in 
order to determine the gross tax rates across income levels. We assume that the 
gross tax rate of households at the 2nd decile is fixed in all tax reforms we 
consider.15 Table 17 reports the gross tax rates at various decile points under the 
optimal tax function. The gross tax rates of low-income households change little 
after tax reform. But those of high-income households increase considerably. For 
example, the gross tax rate in the 9th decile increases from 13.7% to 17.9%. 
Table 18 compares the current steady state and the new steady state under 
optimal tax reform. The Gini coefficient before tax and transfers (0.356) under 
optimal tax reform is slightly lower than the current one (0.366). However, the Gini 
coefficient after tax and transfers decreases from 0.318 to 0.274 after reform. As a 
result, taxes and transfers reduce the Gini coefficient by 23% under optimal tax 
reform, which is 13.2% in the current steady state. The tax reform has little effect 
on wealth distribution; the new wealth Gini (0.536) is similar to the current one  
?
13According to the HIES (2010) , the average equivalized income is 1.8 million won per month. 
14Since the average level of taxation, ? , is changing in transitions, marginal and net tax rates in transitions 
are different from those in the new steady state 
15We fix the gross tax rates of households at the 2nd decile point instead of at the 1st decile point because the 
approximation of the HSV function is known to be poor at the very low-income level. 
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TABLE 18—CURRENT AND NEW STEADY STATE UNDER OPTIMAL TAX REFORM 
Variables Current Steady State (CS) 
New Steady State 
(NS) 
Ratio 
(NS/CS) 
Before-tax Gini (BG)  0.366 0.356 0.97 
After-tax Gini (AG)  0.318 0.274 0.86 
Improvement Rate (1-AG/BG)  0.132 0.230 1.74 
Wealth Gini      0.545 0.536 0.98 
Interest Rate (r)  0.060 0.084 1.40 
Wage Rate (w)     1.010 0.935 0.93 
Labor Hours (H)  0.398 0.384 0.96 
Aggregate Output (Y)   0.670 0.591 0.88 
Aggregate Capital (K)  1.508 1.159 0.77 
Aggregate Consumption (C)  0.436 0.401 0.92 
Government Consumption (G)  0.079 0.074 0.94 
Net Tax Rate     0.038 -0.009 - 
Consumption Tax / GDP  0.065 0.068 - 
Government Consumption/GDP  0.125 0.125 - 
Capital Tax/GDP      0.032 0.063 - 
Income Tax/GDP     0.087 0.107 - 
?
(0.545). Since high tax rates lower after-tax returns on capital, and more social 
transfers weaken the insurance motive under tax reform, individual savings 
decrease drastically and the interest rate rises. The capital stock after tax reform is 
77% of current steady state, and the corresponding interest rate is now 8.4% (the 
current rate is 6%). On the contrary, both wage and working hours fall in the new 
steady state. Low capital stock and labor supply reduce total output by 12%. 
Aggregate consumption also decreases, but not as much as output. Increases in tax 
progressivity raise tax revenues on income. However, social transfers increase 
more than income tax and the net tax rate decreases. Tax revenues on capital 
income increase from 3.2% in the current steady state to 6.3% in the new steady 
state. 
Figure 5 demonstrates the transition paths from the current to the new steady 
state under optimal tax reform. All values are relative to the current steady-state 
level, which is set to 100. Output drops sharply as soon as the new tax reform is in 
place, and then decreases gradually. Since households reduce savings, aggregate 
capital falls continuously. Aggregate consumption rises slightly in the beginning as 
accumulated capital is spent, but goes below the current level in the long run. 
Working hours drop in the beginning and remain low. The interest rate, which falls 
in the beginning, keeps rising to 40% higher than the current rate. On the contrary, 
wages increase in the beginning and then falls. 
We now calculate how many households are better off from each tax reform. In 
computing welfare under tax reform, we include welfare during the transition to the 
new steady state. Table 19 reports the fraction of households (%) that are better off 
from each tax reform. Under optimal tax reform ( *? = 0.24, *k? = 0.39), about 64% 
of households are better off. If we assume that voting is binary between the current 
and the new tax scheme, 64% of households will support optimal tax reform. 
Figure 6 illustrates the asset and productivity levels at which households are 
indifferent between the optimal tax reform and the status quo. For comparison with 
the actual data, we convert the units in our model to 2010 wons (by matching 
average income in our model to that in the 2010 HIES). Average working hours in 
our model, 0.398, is also set to the average annual working hours 2,187 in Korea 
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?
FIGURE 5. TRANSITION PATHS TO THE NEW STEADY STATE 
Note: All values are relative to the current steady state, which is normalized to 100.  
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TABLE 19— FRACTION OF HOUSEHOLDS (%) BETTER OFF FROM TAX REFORMS 
Progressivity Capital Tax Rates (?k) 
(?) 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.44 
0.14 - 64.4 63.5 62.6 61.5 
0.19 79.8 75.5 70.3 67.2 61.5 
0.24 72.5 71.1 67.3 64.4 62.1 
0.29 63.6 61.8 60.1 57.5 55.3 
?
?
FIGURE 6. ONES BETTER OFF AND WORSE OFF FROM THE OPTIMAL TAX REFORM 
Note: Assets and wages are rescaled so that average income in the model matches that in the data. 
?
TABLE 20—WELFARE GAINS AT CONSUMPTION DECILES 
Decile Points 1st 2nd 4th 6th 8th 9th 
Consumption Equivalence (%)  3.4 2.1 1.3 0.2 -1.4 -3.4 
Amount (thousand won)    709 540 404 80 -618 -1,656 
?
(OECD 2010). In Figure 6 households below the dotted line are better off with the 
optimal tax reform. Clearly, households with low asset and low productivity win 
from tax reform. (The vertical and horizontal lines in Figure 6 represent the 
average and ±  one standard deviation of assets and individual productivity.16) 
We also report the welfare gains at various consumption deciles under optimal 
tax reform in Table 20. The welfare gains of a particular household i , i? , in 
consumption-equivalence units is:  
 
0 0 1 1
=0 =0
((1 ? ) , ) = ( , )t ti i i i i
t t
? U c h ? U c h?
? ?? ?   
 
?
16The standard deviations of individual productivity are not symmetric, because the wage process is log 
normal. 
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where 0ic , 0ih  are the initial steady states and 1ic , 1ih  are those after reform 
(including transitions) for each individual i . Household in the 1st consumption 
decile gain 3.4% in terms of permanent consumption. Households in the 2nd, 4th, 
6th deciles also gain welfare. However, households in the 8th and 9th deciles lose 
welfare by as much as 1.4% and 3.4% of their permanent consumption, 
respectively. When converted into 2010 won units, households in the 1st decile 
gain 709 thousand won and those in the 9th decile lose 1,656 thousand won. 
      ?
D. Robustness 
?
1. Administrative Costs 
?
In our benchmark model, we assume that there is no administrative cost 
associated with collecting taxes and transferring resources (or cost associated with 
bureaucracy). However, collecting tax revenues as well as transferring incomes 
may require costs. In this section, we introduce some administrative costs of 
government. 
While it is difficult to measure the cost of bureaucracy, according to the OECD, 
the cost of collection ratio (administrative costs/net revenues) among 32 OECD 
countries was 1.1% on average in 2010.17 In the same report, the cost ratio in 
Korea was 0.81%. Eurostat reports the structure of social protection expenditure 
among 28 EU countries. Administrative costs account for 3.0% of total expenditure 
in 2012.18 Based on these numbers, we now assume that the administrative cost is 
4% of total transfers (1% for collecting taxes and 3% for transferring). As a result, 
total government expenditure becomes TR0.04G +  where TR  is the total 
amount of transfer.19 
Table 21 compares social welfare under different tax reforms, now with 
additional administrative costs. The optimal tax progressivity with administrative 
costs is the same as that without additional administrative costs, but the optimal 
capital tax rate is lower without such costs. Raising tax progressivity ?  from 0.14 
to 0.24 and the capital tax rate k?  from 0.24 to 0.34 generates the largest social 
welfare. (The optimal tax without administrative costs is ? =0.24, k? =0.39.) 
?
TABLE 21—WELFARE GAINS IN CONSUMPTION EQUIVALENTS WITH ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Progressivity Capital Tax Rates (?k) 
(?) 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.44 
0.14 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.12 
0.19 0.44 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.48 
0.24 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.58 0.52 
0.29 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.31 0.24 
Notes: All numbers are % change (consumption equivalent) from the current steady state. 
?
17OECD, “Tax Administration 2013: Comparative Information on OECD and Other Advanced and Emerging 
Economies,” p. 180. 
18Eurostat (online data code: spr_exp_sum) 
19Note that we assume that / =G Y ?  is fixed. 
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Welfare gains are as much as 0.60% of permanent consumption, which is 205 
thousand in 2010 wons. 
?
2. Capital Outflows 
?
There is widespread concern about possible capital outflows when moving to 
high capital tax and progressive income tax schedule. To address this, we consider 
tax reforms in an open economy version by fixing the interest rate at the current 
steady state 6%. Under perfect capital mobility, the difference between household 
savings (domestic capital) and aggregate capital implied by the fixed interest rate 
reflects capital outflows (or inflows). We assume that government consumption is a 
fixed share of (before-tax) aggregate household incomes.20 We also assume that 
only domestic household incomes are subject to the capital tax. Table 22 reports 
welfare gains under various tax reforms. The optimal tax reform is virtually the 
same as that in benchmark economies—increasing tax progressivity ( ? ) to 0.24 
and capital tax rates ( K? ) to 0.39. 
However, there is a significant capital outflow when the economy moves to high 
capital tax and more progressive income tax schedule. Table 23 reports the ratio of 
domestic capital under the new steady state to domestic capital under the current 
steady state. With optimal tax reform, domestic capital decreases to almost half 
(47%) of its current level. 
?
TABLE 22— CONSUMPTION EQUIVALENTS UNDER PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM 
Progressivity Capital Tax Rates (?k) 
(?) 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.44 
0.14 - 0.13 0.22 0.28 0.32 
0.19 0.61 0.70 0.76 0.79 0.80 
0.24 0.90 0.95 0.99 1.00 0.99 
0.29 0.86 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.90 
Notes: All numbers are % change (consumption equivalent) from the current steady state. 
?
TABLE 23— DOMESTIC CAPITAL/CURRENT CAPITAL UNDER PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM 
Progressivity Capital Tax Rates (?k) 
(?) 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.44 
0.14 100.0 92.0 84.7 77.9 71.8 
0.19 78.4 72.2 66.4 61.2 56.4 
0.24 60.2 55.5 51.1 47.1 43.5 
0.29 45.1 41.6 38.4 35.4 32.8 
?
V. Conclusion?
? ?
We develop a quantitative general equilibrium model and calibrate it to match 
the salient features of the Korean economy. With this model, we look for the 
combination of progressivity in the tax function and the capital income tax rate that 
?
20Aggregate output and aggregate incomes are different in an open economy. 
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maximizes utilitarian social welfare. According to our model, a more progressive 
income tax schedule increases the average welfare of the society. The marginal 
income tax rates in the 9th decile should increase from the current 22% to 31%. 
Also, the optimal capital tax rate (39%) is 15 percentage point higher than the 
current one. Under optimal tax reform, the average household gains welfare by as 
much as 0.86% of steady-state consumption, which is approximately 300 thousand 
won per year in 2010 values. The majority (64%) of households are better off, 
mostly those with low assets and low productivity. More specifically, households in 
the 1st consumption decile gain welfare by as much as 3.4% of consumption (709 
thousand won per year). But, households in the 9th decile lose welfare by as much 
as 3.4% of consumption (1,656 thousand won per year). 
Despite the potential welfare gain from more progressive and high capital 
income taxes, we would like to note that our results should be interpreted with 
caution because our benchmark model does not take into account possible capital 
outflows or the increased administrative costs associated with high income taxes. 
An open-economy version of our model does indicate that there will be a 
significant capital flight from a high capital income tax. Sizable administrative 
costs would also undermine the potential welfare gains from high taxes. 
?
APPENDIX 
 
A: Taxes in Korea
  
As described in the data section, the tax system in Korea consists of ten national 
and eleven local taxes. Out of those taxes, three taxes (income tax, corporation tax 
and value-added tax) account for most tax revenues. In this section, we will 
describe the detailed tax rates of the three main taxes and social security 
contributions.  
Income Tax: A person, either a resident or a non-resident, is liable to income tax 
on items of income-derived sources. “Under global taxation, real estate rental 
income, business income, earned income, and miscellaneous income attributed to a 
resident are aggregated and taxed progressively. Interest and dividends are subject 
to tax withholdings” (MOSF 2012, p. 3). Table 24 reports the marginal income tax 
rates across income brackets. The tax rates on individual income range from 6 
percent to 38 percent. When the local income tax is included, the income tax rate 
ranges from 6.6 percent to 41.8 percent. 
?
TABLE 24— INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES BY INCOME BRACKETS 
Taxable Income Marginal Tax Rate (%) 
(Million Won) National Local Total 
Under 12 6 0.6 6.6 
12 - 46 15 1.5 16.5 
46 - 88 24 2.4 26.4 
88 - 150 35 3.5 38.5 
Over 150 38 3.8 41.8 
Source: National Tax Service (2015). 
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Wages and salary incomes are included in taxable income after deductions as 
specified in Table 25 below. Residents with global income are entitled to annually 
deduct an amount equivalent to 1.5 million won multiplied by the number of 
persons in the taxpayer’s family (MOSF 2012). The vulnerable (such as the old and 
the disabled) and households with many dependent children are eligible for 
additional deductions.  
?
TABLE 25— INCOME TAX DEDUCTION RATE 
Total Earnings (Million Won) Marginal Deduction Rate (%) 
Under 5 70 
5 - 15 40 
15 - 45 15 
45 - 100 5 
Over 100 2 
Source: National Tax Service (2015). 
?
Corporation Tax: A domestic company is liable to tax on its worldwide income, 
and a foreign company is liable to tax on its Korean-source income (MOSF 2012). 
According to the National Tax Service, the marginal tax rates are as below: 10% 
(11% including the local corporation tax) when the tax base is the same as or less 
than 200 million won, 20% (22% including the local corporation tax) between 200 
million won and 20 billion won, and 22% (24.2% including the local corporation 
tax) over 20 billion won.  
?
TABLE 26— CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES BY INCOME BRACKETS 
Taxable Income Marginal Tax Rate (%) 
(Million Won) National Local Total 
Under 200 10 1 11 
200 - 20,000 20 2 22 
Over 20,000 22 2.2 24.2 
Source: National Tax Service (2015). 
?
Value-Added Tax: A person who engages in the supply of goods and services 
and a person who imports goods and services are liable to value-added tax (MOSF 
2012). The rate of value-added tax is 10% of added value (National Tax Service 
2015). 
  
Social Security: In Korea all citizens must subscribe four compulsory insurance 
plans: National Pension, National Health Insurance, Employment Insurance, and 
Workers Compensation Insurance. Contributions to the National Pension are 9% of 
the wages of workers (employer 4.5%, employee 4.5%) or the income of the self-
employed (National Pension Service, 2015). For National Health Insurance, wage 
workers pays 6.07 % of their wages (employer 3.035%, employee 3.035%) as a 
contribution, and they also pay additional 6.55% of health insurance contributions 
for Long-term Care Insurance (National Health Insurance Service, 2015). The 
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contributions of the self-employed are determined by income, wealth and economic 
status. For Employment Insurance, employees pay 0.65% of their wages and 
employers pay 2.85% of an employee’s wage. Contributions for Workers 
Compensation Insurance vary across industries. 
?
B: Computational Procedures
      
1. Steady-State Equilibrium 
  
The distribution of households, )x,a(? , is time-invariant in the steady state, as 
are factor prices. We modify the algorithm suggested by José-Víctor Ríos-Rull 
(1999) in finding a time-invariant distribution ? . Computing the steady-state 
equilibrium amounts to finding the value functions, the associated decision rules, 
and the time-invariant measure of households. We search for (i) the discount factor 
?  that clears the capital market at the given annual rate of return of 6%; (ii) the 
disutility parameter B  to match the average hours worked, 0.398; and (iii) the 
average levels of taxation ?  to match net income tax rates, 3.75%. The details are 
as follows: 
  
1) Choose the grid points for asset holdings ( a ) and idiosyncratic productivity 
( x ). The number of grids is denoted by aN , and xN , respectively. We use 
aN = 326, xN =31. The asset holding ta  is in the range of [0, 50]. The grid 
points of assets are not equally spaced. We assign more points on the lower 
asset range to better approximate the savings decisions of households near the 
borrowing constraint. For idiosyncratic productivity, we construct a grid 
vector of length xN  whose elements, jxln ’s, are equally spaced on the 
interval [ 23 / 1x x? ?? ?  ]. Then, we approximate the transition matrix of 
idiosyncratic productivity using Tauchen’s (1986) algorithm. 
 
2) Pick initial values of ? , B , and ? . Given ? , B , x? , x? , and ? , we 
solve the individual value functions V  at each grid point of individual 
states. In this step, we also obtain the optimal decision rules for asset 
holdings )x,a(a ji?  and labor supply )x,a(h ji . This step involves the 
following procedure: 
  
(a) Initialize value functions 0 ( , )i jV a x for all =1,2, , xj N? , and 
=1,2, , xj N? .  
(b) Update value functions by evaluating the discretized versions:  
 
1
1
( ( , ) (1 ) )
( , ) = max{ ( , ( , ))
1
?
i j j k i i
i j i j
c
? wh a x x ? ra a a
V a x u h a x?
? ?? ? ? ?
?   
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0
=1
( , )) ( | )},
Nx
j x j j
j
? V a x ? x x? ?
?
?? ?
  
where ( | )x j j? x x?  is the transition probabilities of x , which is 
approximated using Tauchen’s algorithm.  
(c) If 1V  and 0V  are close enough for all grid points, then we have found 
the value functions. Otherwise, set 0V = 1V , and go back to step 2(b).  
 
3) Using ( , )i ja a x? , ( | )x j j? x x?  obtained from step 3, we obtain the time-
invariant measures *( , )i j? a x  as follows   
        
(a) Initialize the measure 0 ( , )i j? a x .  
(b) Update the measure by evaluating the discretized version of a law of 
motion:  
 
1 = ( , ) 0
=1 =1
( , ) = 1 ( , ) ( | )
N Na x
i j a a a x i j x j ji i j
i j
? a x ? a x ? x x? ? ? ????
  
(c) If 1?  and 0?  are close enough in all grid points, then we have found 
the time-invariant measure. Otherwise, replace 0?  with 1?  and go 
back to step 3(b).  
 
4) We calculate the real interest rate, individual hours worked, net income tax 
rate, and other aggregate variables of interest using *?  and decision rules. If 
the calculated real interest rate, average hours worked, and net income tax 
rates are close to the assumed ones, we have found the steady state. 
Otherwise, we choose a new ? , B , ? , and go back to step 2.  
 
2. Optimal Tax Reform 
  
Individual utilities include those in the transition periods from the initial to the 
new steady state. We compute the value functions and decision rules backwards 
and the measure of households forward. Computing the transition equilibrium 
amounts to finding the value functions, the associated decision rules, and the 
measure of households in each period. The details are as follows: 
  
1) Compute the initial steady state under the current tax rate. Use the algorithm 
for the steady-state equilibrium. 
 
2) Choose new tax parameters (progressivity ? , capital tax rate k? ) and 
compute all transition paths as follows 
 
(a) Compute the final steady state under new tax parameters. Use the 
algorithm for the steady-state equilibrium. However, the discount factor 
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?  and disutility parameter B are fixed, and we find the real interest rate 
where the calculated real interest rate is close to the assumed one. The 
average level of taxation ?  is chosen so that calculated total tax 
revenues are close to the sum of total transfers and government 
consumption. 
 
(b) Assume that the transition is completed after 1T ?  periods and the 
economy is in the initial steady state at time 1 and in the final steady state 
at T . Choose T  big enough so that the transition path is unaltered by 
increasingT .  
(c) Guess the capital per effective labor 1=2{ / }
T
t t tK E
?  and compute the 
associated 1=2{ , }
T
t t tr w
?  .  
(d) Guess the path of average level of taxation, 1=2{ }
T
t? ? . Note that the average 
levels of taxation are all different in each period, since decision rules and 
measures are different. From backwards, compute the value functions 
and policy functions for all transition periods by using ( )TV ?  from the 
final steady state. Using the initial steady-state distribution 1?  and the 
decision rules, find measures of all periods 1=2{ }
T
t t? ? .  
 
(e) Based on the decision rules and measures, compute the aggregate 
variables, tax revenues, transfers and government consumption. If total 
tax revenues are close to the sum of total transfers and government 
consumption, we obtain the average level of taxation. Otherwise, choose 
a new path of the average level of taxation and go back to 2(d).  
 
(f)  Compute the paths of aggregated capital and effective labor and compare 
them with the assumed paths. If they are close enough in each period, we 
find the transition paths. Otherwise, update 1=2{ / }
T
t t tK E
?  and go back to 
2(c).  
 
3. Choose tax parameters that yield the highest social welfare. This is the optimal 
tax rate under the utilitarian criteria. 
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